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Executive Orders-Has Illinois A Strong Governor
Concept?
RICHARD E. FAVORITI*
Political turmoil and an activist governor inevitably generate an
increased awareness regarding the office of the governor and the
powers delegated thereto. It is the purpose of this article to examine
one such gubernatorial power-the governor's authority to issue a
proclamation or an executive order.' The subject matter of executive
orders and proclamations will be treated generally; major emphasis
will be placed upon the power of the Illinois governor to issue these
mandates in light of two recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions.'
EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Executive orders and proclamations originated with the English
* Partner, Burditt and Calkins, Chicago, Illinois; B.S.C., DePaul University; J.D., Northwestern University Law School, 1968; Instructor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1. A proclamation or executive order is a declaration promulgated by both presidents and
governors to implement powers delegated to their offices by constitution or statute. Generally,
such pronouncements require government officials or private citizens to act in a given way.
See, e.g., Morgan, Achieving National Goals through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an
UnconstrainedAdministrative Process, 1974 Wisc. L. REV. 301, 307. Although their form and
style depend upon the personal judgment of the author, statutes may partially remove individuality by prescribing the content of these mandates. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 3304
(1973).
Executive orders or proclamations may cover a variety of subjects ranging from the most
routine matters to issues of major governmental significance. The most familiar type of
proclamation issued by the chief executive is ceremonial and orders the recognition and
observance of special days. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, § 16 (1973) (Citizenship Day);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 3366 (1973) (White Cane Safety Day); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 22-7
(1973) (Announcing Election Results).
The daily administration of governmental activities in the Executive Department may
warrant the issuance of a second form of executive order. For example, an executive order
may establish a procedure for designating certain officers to act in the absence of other
officials serving under the supervision of the chief executive. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
part 2, ch. 41, § 2002 (1972); State of Iowa Exec. Order No. 5,April 11, 1961, wherein the
Governor of Iowa issued an Executive Order to "All State Departments" requesting that all
state owned automobiles stationed and operated in the Des Moines area be "inspected." See
also, Exec. Order No. 11822, 3A C.F.R. 204 (1974).
A third type of executive order may, because of certain established circumstances, go
beyond the administration of government and call for action that would affect private citizens. For instance, upon a finding that a certain area is in a state of riot, insurrection or
invasion, statutory or constitutional authority may permit the chief executive to promulgate
a proclamation or executive order in an attempt to restore control to that area. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 275 (1973); Exec. Order 11670, 37 Fed. Reg. 10431; Exec. Order No.
11776, 39 Fed. Reg. 11865.
2. Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Buettell v. Walker, 59 Ill. 2d 146,319 N.E.2d 502 (1974).
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king. The monarch enjoyed specific prerogatives and rights which
belonged only to him by virtue of his preeminent position. Certain
direct prerogatives, including the authority to make war and the
right to send ambassadors, were considered a part of the king's
person. 3 Other incidental prerogatives, for example, that no costs
could be recovered against the king and that his debt was preferred
to the debt of anyone else, were exceptions established from the
general rules applicable to the entire kingdom.'
The king's direct and principal prerogatives enabled him to play
a variety of roles. As the fountainhead of justice and the conservator
of peace, 5 the king possessed the power to issue binding proclamations if done to enforce the laws of the realm:
For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct
part, the legislative branch of the sovereign power, yet the manner,
time, and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must
frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate and
therefore his constitutions or edicts concerning these points, which
we call proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they
do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones;
but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being,
in such manner as the king shall judge necessary.'
Unlike the king, the governor's authority to issue a proclamation
or an executive order is not rooted in his position or incidental to
his political person. Unknown to the common law, the office of
governor was created by state constitution to head the executive
department of the state.7 Reacting to the arbitrary and powerful
colonial governors preceding the American Revolution, the legislatures of the newly established states expressed their suspicion and
fear of the governor's office by constitutionally limiting the authority of the executive branch.' In contrast to the king, the governor
possessed only those powers delegated to him by state constitution
or state statute, and such powers were additionally limited in that
they could be exercised only in the manner provided.' Although the
prestige and influence of the governor increased with time and the
growing complexity of state government, 10 the governor, in a consti3. W.

BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 240 (3rd ed. T. Cooley 1884).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 266.
6. Id. at 270.
7. Royster v. Brock, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W.2d 707 (1935).
8. W. ANDERSON, C. PENNIMAN, E. W. WEIDNER. GOVERNMENT IN THE 50 STATES 258-59
(1960); C.O. JOHNSON, H. CASTLEBERRY, T. SWANSON, D. M. OGDEN, JR., AMERICAN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 33 (4th ed. 1965).
9. Royster v. Brock, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W.2d 707 (1935).
10. C.B. ADRIAN, GOVERNING OUR 50 STATES AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 32 (3rd ed. 1972); W.
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tutional framework, has never regained those executive powers once
held by the king. Parallel to the office of the President," the governor's authority to issue an executive order or proclamation is based
on either: (1) broad or specific constitutional grants of power;" or
(2) general or specific statutory authority. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

Most state constitutions place the "supreme executive power,"' 4
the "chief executive power,"' 5 or the "executive power '"' in the office of the governor, and frequently clothe their chief executive with
the responsibility to "take care that the laws be carefully executed."' 7 Whether these terms in and of themselves grant the necessary authority to the governor to issue a proclamation or an executive order is the subject of divided opinion.
In a "strong governor" jurisdiction, provisions granting, delegating, or vesting the executive power of the state in the governor are,
in themselves, general grants of executive power. All specific grants
of constitutional power appearing thereafter are merely directions
or mandates as to the manner in which the general grants of power
C. PENNIMAN, E.W. WEIDNER, GOVERNMENT IN THE 50 STATES 265-66 (1960).
11. Certain notable differences appear between presidential and gubernatorial utilization
of executive orders and proclamations. First, because the office of the governor is, in comparison to that of the President, far more restricted in terms of the powers delegated to it,
executive orders and proclamations issued by the latter may and do cover a greater magnitude
of subjects. See generally C.R. ADRIAN, GOVERNING OUR 50 STATES AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 3637 (3d ed. 1972). Secondly, executive orders or proclamations issued by the President currently appear numerically in the Federal Register and the U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News. Additional information regarding presidential proclamations also appears in the United States Statutes at Large. See generally W.F. SWINDLER, COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY - THE NEW LEGALITY 419-20 (1970).
Some states require partial publication of executive orders. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art.
41, § 15CE (1974 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, part 2, ch. 41, § 2002 (1972) and Appendix to
title 3. Illinois does not statutorily mandate publication of executive orders or proclamations
issued by the Governor. Although ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 124, § 6a (1973), authorizes the Secretary
of State to provide for the publication of these pronouncements, no such publication is
available to the general public. Instead, any executive order or proclamation issued by the
Governor is numbered and filed with the Secretary of State's office. In order for a citizen to
obtain a copy of a gubernatorial executive order or proclamation, he must first obtain the
number of the pronouncement desired. Unfortunately, there is no index readily available that
could be of assistance to an individual in finding this reference number. Once the number of
the executive order or proclamation has been uncovered, a request can be placed with the
Secretary of State's office at which time a copy of the document will be forwarded.
12. ALA. CONST., art. 5, § 122 (1901).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-11-104 through 24-11-107; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2420-108 and 24-20-201.
14. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
15. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
16. IND. CONST. art. V, § 1.
17. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 120; MINN CONST. art. V, § 4.
ANDERSON,
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are to be exercised.' 8 Hence, in such jurisdictions, the general provisions alone would authorize the governor's promulgation of an executive order or proclamation.
Other jurisdictions,' 9 particularly Illinois, have traditionally
taken an opposite view regarding the meaning of these same general
provisions. For more than a century, Illinois' resolution of this question was contained in the 1839 decision of Field v. People ex rel.
McClernand.0 The Illinois Supreme Court in Field' confronted the
question of whether general language in the state constitution supported the governor's removal of the Secretary of State from office
and the appointment of a successor at will.
Arguments in support of the governor's implied power to act centered upon five sections of the Illinois Constitution of 1818, two of
which provided:
22
The executive power of the state shall be vested in a governor.
He, the governor, may require information in writing from the
officers in the executive department, upon any subject relating to
the duties of their respective
offices, and shall take care that the
23
laws be faithfully executed.
In determining whether there was authority for the governor's
action, the court admitted that in addition to those powers expressly
granted in the constitution, other powers, necessary to implement
the express authority provided, may be implied therefrom and conferred upon the chief executive. 2 The court stated that as a general
rule whenever a constitution expressly grants a power or enjoins a
duty, it also gives by implication that particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other.2 Thus, the
doctrine of implication must be predicated upon a grant of express
power.
Looking to the sections advanced in support of the governor's
action, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that certain provisions,
including article III, section 12 and article III, section 7,27 were mere
18. See Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
19. Holder v. Anderson, 160 Ga. 433, 128 S.E. 181 (1925); State v. Iron Cliffs Company,
54 Mich. 350, 20 N.W. 493 (1884); Territory ex rel. Wade v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. 85 (Johnson),
12 P. 879 (1887); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 140 S.W. 405 (1911).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
Id.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1818).
ILL. CONST. art. IfI, § 7 (1818).
Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79, 83 (1839).

25. Id.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id. at 90-91.
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declarations of fundamental governmental principles which conferred no express powers upon the governor. Since no powers had
been expressly granted, no additional powers could be implied
therefrom.
8 decision and its interpretation
For more than a century the Field"
of the constitutional provisions considered therein remained virtually untouched. The opportunity to re-examine the vitality of
9 took place on August 20,
Field"
1973, when Illinois Governor Daniel
Walker pronounced his Executive Order No. 5 (1973).3o This order
mandated "suppliers" of certain state agencies and "regulated businesses" to file statements with the Illinois Department of Finance
disclosing contributions made by these organizations and certain
defined "key persons" to: (1) any candidate for state public office;
(2) any elected official holding state public office; and (3) any organization, committee, fund, party, or other entity which gave anything
of value to a candidate for state public office. The order required
that the initial disclosure statement reveal those contributions
made during the preceding 24 months. Individuals or entities who
continued to be "suppliers" or "regulated businesses" were required
to disclose their respective lists of contributions by filing statements
on a semi-annual basis.
Reaction to Executive Order No. 5 was immediate and adverse.
On September 11, 1973, an action was filed in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division, seeking inter alia, to restrain the governor and the Director of the Department of Finance
from enforcing Executive Order No. 5. 3 1 On September 21, 1973, the
trial court concluded that the governor was without authority to act
in this regard and that Executive Order No. 5 exceeded the authority of the executive department, constituted legislation, and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction was granted. An interlocutory appeal, taken
by defendants, was brought directly to the Illinois Supreme Court
32
pursuant to Rule 302(b).
Recognizing that the plaintiffs' attack covered a broad range, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Buettell v. Walker, 33 ruled that Executive
Order No. 5 did not violate the right to privacy 34 or the equal protec28. 3 Ill.
(2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
29. Id.
30. Exec. Order No. 5 appears in Appendix 2.
31. Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Walker, 73 Ch. 5366, Report of Proceedings,
September 21, 1973, Judge Walter P. Dahl presiding.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302(b) (1973).
33. 59 Il. 2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502 (1974).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12 (1970).
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tion3" clauses of the federal and Illinois Constitutions. However, the
court noted that the case stood otherwise with respect to the authority of the governor to promulgate Executive Order No. 5.
The court examined provisions of the Illinois Constitution to determine whether the governor had the authority to issue Executive
Order No. 5: (1) article V, section 8; and (2) article XIII, section 2.
Noting that Executive Order No. 5, on its face, purported to be a
gubernatorial exercise of authority independently derived from the
State Constitution and not the exercise of a delegated power, the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the authority to issue this pronouncement did not fall within article V, section 8 and affirmed the
order entered by the lower court.
Although apparently following Mr. Justice Wilson's reasoning in
Field,36 dicta in the Buettel137 decision marks a possible departure
from Field.3 The court stated that the purpose of Executive Order
No. 5 was to formulate a new legal requirement rather than to
execute an existing one. This implies that the duty to "execute the
laws" in article V, section 8, is a grant of an express power. Hence,
if the purpose of issuing an executive order is to execute a legal
requirement, and there is no express power to issue this order,
power, nevertheless, may be implied from the general grant of power
delegated to the governor in article V, section 8.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Field39 held that provisions vesting
the executive power of the state in the governor and provisions
delegating to him the responsibility to take care that the laws of the
state are faithfully executed were mere declarations of fundamental
principle and did not confer a specific power. Similar language in
article V, section 8 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution should receive
treatment consistent with Field.' However, the court's implicit
suggestion that the chief executive has the power to issue executive
orders which have binding force when that officer seeks to execute
the laws, marks a dramatic shift from Field4 ' toward a "strong governor" concept in Illinois.
The court also considered article XIII, section 2, of the new Illinois Constitution regarding the governor's power to issue an executive order:
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1970).
3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
59 Ill.
2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502 (1974).
3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
Id.

Id.
Id.
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All candidates for or holders of state offices and all members of a
Commission or Board created by this Constitution shall file a verified statement of their economic interests, as provided by law. The
General Assembly by law may impose a similar requirement upon
candidates for, or holders of, offices in units of local government
and school districts. Statements shall be filed annually with the
Secretary of State and shall be available for inspection by the
public. The General Assembly by law shall prescribe a reasonable
time for filing the statement. Failure to file a statement within the
time prescribed shall result in ineligibility for, or forfeiture of,
office. This section shall not be construed as limiting the authority
of any branch of government to establish and enforce ethical standards for that branch.
The Illinois Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that the authority to issue Executive Order No. 5 could not be found within article
XIII, section 2:
The power granted by that provision does not, in our opinion,
include the power to establish and enforce ethical standards for
persons doing business with the executive branch. The present
order does not regulate the conduct of officers and employees of the
executive branch. Instead, its impact, including its sanctions, is
upon third persons who are not a part of State government. It does
not therefore fall within the authority granted by section 2 of article XIII.1
This part of the court's opinion refers to a prior Illinois decision,
Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker,4" wherein the supreme court sustained Governor Walker's issuance of Executive
Order No. 4 (1973) 44 as a proper exercise of the power granted to the
state chief executive in article XIII, section 2. Executive Order No.
4 required state employees falling within any one of three specified
categories45 to file sworn Statements of Economic Interest together
with their most recent federal and state income tax returns at the
commencement of state service and thereafter at fixed intervals.
Three separate actions 7 were filed in the Circuit Court of Sanga42.
43.
44.
45.

59 I1. 2d 146, 154, 319 N.E.2d 502, 506 (1974).
57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
The full text of Exec. Order No. 4 appears in Appendix 1.
These categories include:
(a) each person appointed by the governor;
(b) each person who receives $20,000.00 or more per year from the State; and
(c) each other person whose position is subject to undue influence, as determined
from time to time by rule of the Board of Ethics.
46. See Appendix 1.
47. Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker, No. 365-73; Illinois Association of
Highway Engineers v. Walker, No. 366-73; Troopers Lodge No. 41, Fraternal Order of Police
v. Walker, No. 379-73.
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mon County, each seeking a declaration that, inter alia, Executive
Order No. 4 (1973) be declared illegal, unconstitutional,4 and unenforcible against the plaintiffs49 and all persons similarly situated.
Excepting certain invalidated portions of the order, the trial court
entered judgment, sustaining the overall validity of Executive Order
No. 4. Pursuant to Rule 302(b)50 an appeal was brought directly to
the Illinois Supreme Court.
The court first considered the power of the governor to promulgate
Executive Order No. 4 upon the authority granted to the governor
in article XIII, section 2. Mr. Justice Schaefer, speaking for a majority of the court, stated that the ". . . source of authority of the
executive branch with respect to ethical standards and statements
of economic interests has been section 2 of article XIII. . . ."" and
held that this provision empowered the governor to issue Executive
Order No. 4. However, the court indicated that this provision was
not without limitation. The court focused upon article V of the
previously repealed Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.52 That statute
had given limited authority to the governor and each elected state
official in the Executive Department to promulgate detailed codes
of conduct for appointed officers and employees under their respective jurisdictions. The court implied that article XIII, section 2
carries with it the same limitation contained in this obsolete section
of the Ethics Act. Further support for the court's implicit restriction
of the power contained within article XIII, section 2, is found in the
remarks of Delegate Canfield at the 1970 Constitutional Convention:
I think that we have to depend on the governor to set up his own
methods of control of his directors, who are under his immediate
supervision.
The elected officers . . . are only under the supervision of the
people. The governor can't enforce a standard of conduct with
48.

The plaintiffs challenged Executive Order No. 4 (1973) on six grounds in that it
unconstitutionally: (a) invaded the right to privacy; (b) violated Illinois statutes
and the constitution; (c) went beyond the power of the governor to issue such an
order; (d) discriminated between members of the same class; (e) was unduly vague;
and (f) violated due process.
49. The plaintiffs involved in the 3 actions were: (a) individual state employees
and the Illinois State Employees Association; (b) individual highway engineers and
the Illinois Association of Highway Engineers; and (c) individual members of the
State Highway Police and Trooper Lodge No. 41, Fraternal Order of Police.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302(b) (1973).
51. 57 Ill.
2d 512, 518, 315 N.E.2d 9, 12 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
52. Art. V, repealed by Public Act 77-1806, effective January 24, 1972. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 127, §§ 605-101 et seq. (1973).
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them. In his own directed department he's got the responsibility
and duty of doing it . . ."
A third possible constitutional source authorizing the issuance of
an executive order is article V, section 11, which states:
The Governor, by Executive Order, may reassign functions among
or reorganize executive agencies which are directly responsible to
him. If such a reassignment or reorganization would contravene a
statute, the Executive Order shall be delivered to the General
Assembly. If the General Assembly is in annual session and if the
Executive Order is delivered on or before April 1, the General
Assembly shall consider the Executive Order at the annual session.
If the General Assembly is not in annual session or if the Executive
Order is delivered after April 1, the General Assembly shall consider the Executive Order at its next annual session, in which case
the Executive Order shall be deemed to have been delivered on the
first day of that annual session. Such an Executive Order shall not
become effective if, within 60 days after its delivery to the General
Assembly, either house disapproves the Executive Order by the
record vote of a majority of the members elected. An Executive
Order not so disapproved shall become effective by its terms, but
not less than 60 calendar days after its delivery to the General
Assembly.
This provision, contained in the 1970 Illinois Constitution, is new
to Illinois government. Chairman Tecson, at the 1970 Constitutional
Convention, commented that the powers granted to the governor in
article V, section 2, like the powers granted in article XIII, section
2, are limited to those individuals directly responsible to the governor:
It's a device which is new to the state of Illinois. It [is] present in
other states in their constitutions, and the purpose of this section
is to give authority to the governor to reorganize agencies which are
directly responsible to him. It in no way touches upon or impinges
upon the authority of other elected officers. It in no way touches
upon or impinges upon quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
boards-for example, the Commerce Commission or the Industrial
Commission. It is designed mostly to assist the governor in his duty
as chief executive to help realign functions, mostly in his code
departments. It is not intended to create any authority or to remove any authority."
Plaintiffs in Illinois State Employees Association" contended,
53. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONVENTION, Vol. In at 1753 (1969-70)
(verbatim transcripts).
54. Id. at 1327.
55. 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
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based upon article V, section 2, that Executive Order No. 4 was
invalid because it had not been submitted to the General Assembly
before it became effective. However, plaintiffs failed to identify any
statute contravened by Executive Order No. 4 and, the court, unaware of any such statute, ruled that this Executive Order did not
violate article V, section 11.
Finally, article II, section 1 and article II, section 2 may be suggested as additional sources of constitutional authority for the governor's issuance of an executive order or proclamation. Article II,
section 1 provides:
The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.
However, the drafters of the 1970 Constitution commented that
this provision is not intended to grant any power to the governor,
but merely reiterates the separation of powers doctrine fundamental
to our system of government:
We do not intend in any way to change the purport of the article.
We recognize that probably there is no [real] need to have an
article on the separation or distribution of powers. However, this
is such an essential and traditional part of our form of government,
and it is a part of nearly every constitution of this country. We
therefore felt that it would be appropriate-and as a traditionalist
I feel it is almost essential-to have an expression of the basic
principle upon which our government works."
Article II, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, another
new provision, states that "[t]he enumeration in this Consititution
of specified powers and functions shall not be construed as a limitation of powers of state government." The Constitutional Commentary indicates that:
Section 2 was probably intended, in part, to supercede the case of
Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79 (1839), which held that
a constitution is a limitation on the power of the legislative branch
of government, but a grant of powers (with the attendant problems
of strict construction) to the executive and judicial branches. 7
It is submitted that this provision does not limit or supercede that
8 decision pertaining to general declaratory sections
part of the Field"
of the Illinois Constitution and the inability to imply other powers
therefrom. The application of this section, by its own language, is
56.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONVENTION,

Vol. H at 1067 (1969-70)

(verbatim transcripts).
57. R. Helman & W. Wahlen, Const. Commentary 48, S.H.A., art. II, § 2.
58. 3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
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limited to the "enumeration . . of specified powers and functions
9 Ifa particular section of the constitution speaks only in
...
general declaratory terms and grants no specific power, it would
appear that article II, section 2, would leave the language of that
provision unaffected and, in light of the position adopted by the
0 prohibit an implication of power
Illinois Supreme Court in Field,"
in the absence of an express grant. On the other hand, if there has
been a judicial declaration that a particular constitutional provision
specifies a power or function, then article II, section 2 would apply.
If the dicta in Buettell" suggests that article V, section 8 is more
than the mere declaration of a general principle, then, article II,
section 2, would support an implication of additional powers flowing
from article V, section 8.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY

In addition to those powers delegated to the governor by state
constitution, statutes, either generally or specifically, act as a further basis for the issuance of an executive order or proclamation.
Without any reference to executive orders or proclamations, a statute may describe the duties of the governor in such a way as to
indicate or imply that he has been given powers separate and apart
from those provided by the state constitution. 2 For example, the
Maryland Code provides:
The head of the Executive Department shall be the Governor of
the State, who in addition to the rights, powers, duties, obligations, and functions now or hereafter conferred by law, shall also
have supervision and direction over the officers and agencies
here3
by or hereafter assigned to the Executive Department.
Arguably, such duties could be executed through the issuance of an
executive order or proclamation. On the other hand, a statute may
expressly provide the chief executive of the state with the power to
issue proclamations or executive orders for specific purposes. Matters involving the environment, 4 governmental administration65 and
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1970).
3 I1. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
59 Ill.
2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502 (1974).
IOWA CODE § 8.3 (1) (2) (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-7-1 (1956) provides:
There shall be an executive department. The head of the executive department
shall be the governor. The governor shall have all powers and duties provided by
article VII of the Constitution, by article XV of amendments to the Constitution
and by chapter 1 of title 43, and as further prescribed in all general laws relating
to powers and duties of the governor.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15 (1957).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-20-108 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2111 (rev. 1974).
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 3303 (1973).
59.
60.
61.
62.
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civil disobedience" are typical examples of such legislation.
There is a paucity of Illinois statutory authority expressly granting or implying the power to issue gubernatorial proclamations or
executive orders." Although it has been suggested that the lack of
statutory authority in this regard points to the inherent power implicit within the constitutional provisions pertaining to the governor, the obvious absence of such statutory authority evidences the
legislature's reluctance to grant this type of power, and emphasizes
the restrictions placed upon the office of the State's chief executive.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, the governor's powers, compared to the powers of
the nation's chief executive, are limited. Characterized as a position
of limited discretion, whatever power is to repose in the office of the
governor must initially find its roots in either the state constitution
or a state statute.
A proclamation or executive order is a tool available to the governor in implementing the powers delegated to that office. Although
such pronouncements may cover a variety of subjects, their genesis,
like that of all action taken by a state's chief executive, must lie in
either broad or specific constitutional or statutory authority.
Just exactly how that authority has been defined varies among
the states. Some jurisdictions have adopted a "strong" governor
concept, while others advocate a traditional "weak" governor concept. Regardless of how a particular jurisdiction interprets the powers of its governor, i.e., strong or weak, the essence of state government, especially with its increasing complexity and departmentalization of services, demands well-defined perimeters of gubernatorial authority.
As was demonstrated more than 100 years ago by the Field decision, Illinois views the governor's office as one of limited authority.
Recent controversies, involving the chief executive's use of executive
orders, have provided the judiciary a vehicle to assist in defining the
scope of the governor's authority. However, rather than clarifying
the boundaries of delegated power to this office, the Illinois Supreme Court, especially in Buettell, has not only clouded this controversial area, but also has dramatically diluted an apparently
firmly established principle of Illinois government.
66.
67.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-20-201 (1973); IDAHO CODE, § 19-227 (1947).
Examples of what little authority there is can be found in the Emergency Powers of
the Governor, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 123, § 7 (1973); and in the Militia Powers, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 129, § 220.03 (1973).
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Appendix I
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 4
Ethics Disclosure
The people of the state are entitled to a high standard of candor from their public
servants. The public's right to know must take precedence over the citizen's right
of privacy for purely personal affairs when the citizen becomes a public official.
Accordingly, I hereby order:
1. There is created a Board of Ethics consisting of three members appointed
by the governor to serve at his pleasure. The governor shall, from time
to time, designate one member as chairman. The members of the board
shall receive no compensation for their services.
2. The board shall have jurisdiction over each agency whose vouchers are
subject to approval of the Department of Finance.
3. At the commencement of state service and thereafter between April 15
and April 30 of each succeeding year, each of the following persons in
each agency subject to the jurisdiction of the board shall file with the
board a sworn Statement of Economic Interest and a copy of his most
recent federal and state income tax returns:
a.

Each person appointed by the governor;
b. Each person who received $20,000 or more per year from the state;
and
c. Each other person whose position is subject to undue influence (as
determined from time to time by rule of the board).
4. The Statement of Economic Interest shall contain:
a.
b.

A current net worth statement, disclosing all assets and liabilities
of the person;
A statement of income (including capital gains) received by the
person during the preceding calendar year, disclosing:
1.
2.
3.

each source of income,
the total amount received from the source, and
the nature of the income transactions involving the source.

To provide this information, pertinent portions of federal or state
income tax returns shall be made part of the State of Economic
Interest;
c.

d.

A statement of gifts received by the person during the preceding
calendar year, disclosing all gifts from any source having business
with or regulated by the agency of the person and all gifts of a value
of $50 or more from sources other than members of the person's
family.
A statement of close economic associations, indicating the person's
position with each business or professional entity with which the
person is associated as an officer, employe, director or partner or in
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which he has a substantial interest and identifying those entities
which derive substantial income from the state or from professional
engagements concerning the state.
5. The statement of Economic Interest of each person other than one appointed from the public to serve on a board or commission shall be open
to reasonable public inspection. The board shall provide by rule for the
time, place and manner of inspection.
6. Subject to rule of the board, the Statement of Economic Interest shall
disclose interests of the spouse and immediate family living with the
person making the statement.
7. The failure to make timely filing of a required document, the making of
a false or misleading statement or an omission in a document, and the
failure to cooperate with the board shall be grounds for disciplinary
action, including discharge.
8. The board shall review the documents filed with it, and receive information from the public. The board shall make investigations and reports
to the governor upon finding an apparent conflict of interest or other
impropriety, and may recommend remedial action against the person
involved.
9. The board shall make rules to carry out and enforce this order. The board
shall prepare readily understandable instructions and offer reasonable
assistance to persons subject to this order. The board shall cooperate
with the secretary of state to reduce duplication of effort by persons who
are required to make disclosure under both this order and the Governmental Ethics Act.
10. This order is effective upon filing with the secretary of state and shall
remain in full force and effect unless amended or revoked by executive
action. For 1973, the filings required under paragraph 3 shall be made
by May 30, 1973, or earlier if so provided by rule of the board. Paragraph
13 of Executive Order No. 2, 1971, pertaining to disclosure, and the rules
and regulations of the Department of Personnel implementing that paragraph are superseded.
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Appendix II
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 5
Disclosure of Political Contributions
For too long the relationship between political contributions and state business
has been shrouded in secrecy. The public is entitled to the assurance that the
state's decisions to buy or build are made on the proper basis or price, service and
quality; that decisions in regard to regulated businesses are based on the public
interest.
Suppliers to the state and businesses regulated by the state, together with their
key officials, should not be precluded from participating in the political process
through any proper means, including political contributions where the law so permits. But, it is time to make this financial participation a matter of public record.
The certainty of public exposure will deter the making of contributions for improper purposes and assure people that government decisions are not made on the
basis of political favoritism.
In today's climate, extraordinary steps are required to restore public confidence
in government. It is appropriate that the powers of the Executive be used to the
fullest extent possible to achieve this goal.
Accordingly, I hereby order:
1. For purposes of this Order:
A. "State Agency" means any executive department, commission,
board or agency whose vouchers are subject to approval by the Department of Finance; any board, commission, agency or authority
which has a majority of its members appointed by the Governor; and
the Governor's Office.
B.

"Purchase Transaction" means a purchase, or a contract to purchase, goods or services of any kind by a State agency.

C.

"Supplier" means any individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, joint venture, sole proprietor or other business entity
which is prequalified to enter, or which enters into, a "purchase
transaction" with a State agency.

D.

"Regulated Business" means any individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietor or other business entity which is prequalified to enter, or which enters into, a
"purchase transaction" with a State agency.

D.

"Regulated Business" means any individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietor or other business entity regulated or licensed, or applying to be regulated or
licensed, by the Department of Insurance, the Department of Financial Institutions, the Department of Mines and Minerals excepting
individuals or business entities regulated only under Chapter 93,
Sections 143-156 (which relates to explosives) and Chapter 104, Section 63.1 (which relates to water wells), the Commissioner of Banks
and Trust Companies, the Commissioner of Savings and Loan Asso-
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ciations, the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, the Illinois Racing
Board or the Illinois Commerce Commission.
E.

"Key Person" means (i) any officer, director, partner, proprietor,
managing agent or owner (legal or beneficial) of more than 7 1/2
percent of any supplier or regulated business, (ii) any lobbyist representing such supplier or regulated business who is required to register under the Lobbyist Registration Act; and (iii) any other person
or entity acting at the direction of any person referred to in subparagraph 1 (E) (i) - (ii).

F.

"Political Contribution" means any gifts of money, stocks, bonds,
goods, property, commercial services or anything else of value to
i) any candidate for State public office;
ii) any elected official holding State public office;
iii) any organization, committee, fund, party or other entity giving
money, stocks, bonds, goods, property, commercial services
or anything of value to or on behalf of any candidate for State
public office.

G.

"State Public Office" means all the legislative and executive offices
established under Articles IV and V of the Illinois Constitution.

2.

Each individual or business entity which is or becomes a supplier or
regulated business prior to September 15, 1973, shall, on or before September 15, 1973, file with the Department of Finance a Statement of
Political Contributions and thereafter shall file such Statement as required by rules issued by the Department of Finance pursuant to this
Order, but no less often than semi-annually. Each individual or business
entity which becomes a supplier or regulated business or on or after
September 15, 1973, shall file a Statement of Political Contributions at,
or immediately prior to, the time such individual or business entity
becomes a supplier or regulated business and thereafter shall file such
Statement as required by rules issued by the Department of Finance
pursuant to this Order, but no less often than semi-annually. No supplier
shall be eligible to enter into a purchase transaction unless such Statement has been filed in accord with this Order and the rules issued by
the Department of Finance pursuant thereto.

3.

The Statement of Political Contributions shall be under oath and shall
include the date, amount, donor, donee, and nature of every political
contribution and the date, amount, lender, borrower, terms and extent
of repayment of any loan (other than one made by a lending institution)
to any individual or entity referred to in subparagraph 1 (F) (i) - (iii)
of this Order made within the 24 month period prior to the date of filing
of the Statement (i) by the supplier or regulated business directly or
through any trade or industry association and (ii) by any key person of
that supplier or regulated business; provided, however, that any Statement required to be filed on or before September 15, 1973, shall set forth
the required information for the 24 month period prior to the effective
date of this Order and for the period from the date of this Order through
the date of filing.
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4. The Department of Finance shall, from time to time, as may be necessary and appropriate, issue rules to implement and enforce this Order.
5.

Each Statement of Political Contributions filed under this Order shall
be open to reasonable public inspection in accord with rules issued by
Department of Finance pursuant hereto as to the time, place and manner
of inspection.

6.

This Order is effective upon filing with the Secretary of State and shall
remain in full force and effect unless amended or revoked by Executive
action.
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